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Abstract—The electric grid modernization effort relies on the
extensive deployment of microgrid (MG) systems. MGs integrate
renewable resources and energy storage systems, allowing to gen-
erate economic and zero-carbon footprint electricity, deliver sus-
tainable energy to communities using local energy resources, and
enhance grid resilience. MGs as cyberphysical systems include
interconnected devices that measure, control, and actuate energy
resources and loads. For optimal operation, cyberphysical MGs
regulate the onsite energy generation through support functions
enabled by smart inverters. Smart inverters, being consumer
electronic firmware-based devices, are susceptible to increasing
security threats. If inverters are maliciously controlled, they can
significantly disrupt MG operation and electricity delivery as well
as impact the grid stability. In this paper, we demonstrate the im-
pact of denial-of-service (DoS) as well as controller and setpoint
modification attacks on a simulated MG system. Furthermore, we
employ custom-built hardware performance counters (HPCs) as
design-for-security (DfS) primitives to detect malicious firmware
modifications on MG inverters. The proposed HPCs measure
periodically the order of various instruction types within the
MG inverter’s firmware code. Our experiments illustrate that the
firmware modifications are successfully identified by our custom-
built HPCs utilizing various machine learning-based classifiers.
Index Terms—Microgrids, smart inverters, firmware attacks,
hardware performance counters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid is transitioning from an utility-
centric and hierarchical system to a decentralized, dynamic,
and intelligent grid. This transformation relies on incorporat-
ing renewable resources, microgrids (MGs), demand-response
mechanisms, smart metering infrastructure, and distributed
energy resources (DERs). Renewable portfolio standards pro-
mote the adoption of DERs including energy storage systems,
electric vehicles, solar photovoltaic (PV) plants, and grid-tied
solar inverters. For instance, California has a goal to generate
50% of its power demand using only renewable resources
by 2030 [1]. According to the International Energy Agency
(IEA), the globally distributed solar PV capacity is expected to
increase more than 250% in 2019-2024, reaching 530 GW [2].
Furthermore, by 2050, the forecasted solar and wind generated
capacity will account for almost 30% of the U.S. electricity
demand [3].
The rapid growth of the solar energy market is enabled by
the widespread deployment of solar inverters. A solar or PV
inverter is an electrical converter which converts the variable
direct current (DC) output of a PV solar panel into the utility
* Equal contribution, ordered alphabetically.
frequency alternating current (AC), and thus supply the grid or
use it locally off the grid. Contrary to traditional plants, solar
PV plants and in general DERs are operated by end-users
and aggregators; hence, utilities have limited control of the
power generation. For instance, residentially deployed solar
inverters (e.g., in home installations) are considered consumer
electronic devices [4]. Inverter management systems enable
users to analyze energy consumption and generation patterns
to optimally control home energy expenditure and minimize
operational cost [5]. However, to harness these features and
fine-tune inverter performance, constant communication with
the utility grid is required to ensure current information (e.g.,
energy prices, demand-response schemes, etc.).
The IEEE 1547 interconnection standard specifies the DER
communication requirements as well as the control functions
which should be provided to independent system operators
(ISO) and distribution system operators (DSO) [6]. Despite
the importance of ensuring compliance with the recommen-
dations of IEEE 1547 – as it can significantly reduce threats
targeting the communications and control commands issued
between utilities and DERs – cyberattacks that can disrupt the
normal operation still remain as potential threats. For instance,
adversaries can compromise DER-to-utility communications to
perform denial-of-service (DoS) attacks severely impacting the
distribution system operation.
Although network segmentation could minimize potential
attack entry points, it can introduce issues. Enforcing firewall
rules, virtual private networks (VPNs), secure enclaves, etc.
helps monitoring bidirectional traffic. However, such methods
increase latency, network administration overheads, and in
the case of DER networks (which are constantly expanding
integrating new devices and are not centrally controlled or
owned by one entity), they are often infeasible [7]. Only
recently, works which address computation overheads induced
by securing DER communications have been proposed. For
instance, the authors in [8] propose a lightweight hardware-
based security primitive leveraging real-time grid device en-
tropy to enable secure communication between power system
assets. They validate the framework practicality in a simulation
environment where DER and grid devices utilize IEEE 1815-
Distributed Network Protocol v3 (DNP3) for secure authenti-
cation purposes [9], [10].
Apart from attacks that target the availability of DER
assets through their communication functionalities, malicious
attacks can also target the actual physical components of DER
devices such as smart solar (micro-)inverters and controllers.
Following the same trend with most consumer electronics,
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2Fig. 1: Malicious firmware deployment in a DER-enabled
power grids.
manufacturers typically design DER embedded controllers
using commercial-off-the-self (COTS) components, and there-
fore, vulnerabilities of these modules can be also exploited
in such critical devices. In addition, DERs’ control units
often have limited computing capabilities relying on low-
level hardware systems for their operation without running
an operating system [11]. They typically boot monolithic,
single-purpose firmware and the tasks are executed in a single-
threaded super-loop based execution.
Furthermore, to minimize cost, manufacturers overlook the
security of these controller devices [12]. Software patches are
typically issued to address security flaws post-deployment.
Such updates can be performed manually, i.e., by the device
user or certified personnel, using the wired network that the
device is connected to, or over-the-air (OTA) for wirelessly
connected devices. In [13], the authors demonstrate that attack-
ers can intercept data in-transit during OTA update procedures,
modify them, and update (remotely) malicious firmware im-
ages to programmable controller devices compromising their
operation. In order to address the evident vulnerability of
firmware updates from untrusted sources, the authors of [14]
provide a streamlined approach for secure firmware updates,
however such solutions have yet been deployed in industrial
and commercial embedded systems. Contrary to industrial con-
trollers and other embedded devices of cyberphysical systems
which might be protected by sophisticated security perimeters
(e.g., firewalls, VPNs, network enclaves, demilitarized zones,
etc.), smart inverters are often vulnerable against adversaries
with limited system knowledge and resources [15], [16]. Thus,
attacks targeting the firmware of such embedded systems,
as outlined in Fig. 1, can cause severe impacts to critical
infrastructure. A recent example is the Trisis incident in
2017 targeting petrochemical plants in Saudi Arabia. The
attackers were able to compromise six emergency shut down
controllers managing critical industrial processes (e.g., burner
management) [17]. If the attack was not timely identified,
human lives would be in danger if harmful gases were released
in the petrochemical facility.
In order to mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities of embedded
controllers including smart inverters, anti-virus software (AVS)
has been utilized for the detection of malicious code. However,
attackers have been able to evade AVS through diligently
constructing attacks. For example, attackers can create viruses
that modify the appearance of the code while maintaining
malicious functionality [18]. Thus, a cat-and-mouse race be-
tween attackers and AVS ensues. Attackers attempt to de-
velop novel methods for evading AVS, while AVS seeks to
fortify its defenses. The persistent bolstering of AVS leads
to large computational bandwidth and performance overhead.
Furthermore, AVS cannot always identify polymorphic and
metamorphic malware that can change their execution format
in each iteration of propagation [19]. In order to address the
issues with AVS, researchers have proposed hardware malware
detectors (HMDs) [20]–[22].
HMDs utilize hardware features which, compared to AVS,
are more robust since compromising them is extremely chal-
lenging [19]. Moreover, since HMDs operate on actual hard-
ware, the malware detection latency is lower. Hardware per-
formance counters (HPCs) have emerged as a promising can-
didate for HMDs. HPCs are dedicated registers that keep track
of low-level microarchitectural events such as the number of
branch-misses, CPU cycles, instructions, etc. Towards malware
detection, HPC values collected from the execution of appli-
cations can be used to train machine learning (ML) models,
which classify the programs as benign or malicious [23]–[25].
Despite the detection and performance benefits of HPC-based
HMDs, directly applying it to MG systems is not feasible,
since some embedded legacy controllers do not provide HPC
support.
In this paper, we leverage custom-built HPCs as design-
for-security (DfS) primitives for firmware-based solar inverter
controllers. These custom-built HPCs keep track of the se-
quence of instructions inside the controller firmware. We
utilize ML classifiers and differentiate between maliciously
modified and benign firmware versions. Specifically, our con-
tributions are as follow:
• We design firmware modification attacks for solar invert-
ers considering their characteristics and how they operate
in a MG setup,
• We assess the impact of these attacks targeting the smart
inverter controller on a simulated MG architecture,
• We design custom-built HPCs to enable detection of mali-
cious firmware modifications for such inverter controllers
that do not support HPC functionality, and,
• We utilize different ML classifiers to detect the firmware
modification attacks using our custom-built HPCs values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the background and some preliminary definitions.
Section III describes related work on power systems cy-
bersecurity and HPC-based malware detection. Section IV
describes our proposed methodology and Section V presents
the experimental results. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper and gives directions for our future work.
3II. BACKGROUND
The following subsections include short descriptions of
power systems preliminaries as well as background on HPCs
and ML classifiers used in this study.
A. Power System Preliminaries
The next generation of the power grid, often referred
to as smart grid, leverages information and communication
technologies in order to efficiently and reliably supply elec-
tricity [26], [27]. Contrary to traditional power systems where
electricity flows in one-way from bulk generation facilities to
consumers and loads, smart grid enables bidirectional flow of
energy and information between prosumers, consumers, and
utilities. A MG is a group of generation resources (e.g., natural
gas or biogas generators, wind turbines, solar PV, etc.), energy
storage systems (ESS), and loads (residential, commercial,
or/and industrial), which can operate either in connected or
autonomous/islanding mode. MGs normally operate connected
to and synchronous with the grid, but they can also function
autonomously if necessary (e.g., extreme weather events, util-
ity load shedding to maintain stability, etc.). MGs retain all the
smart grid characteristics including bidirectional energy flow
and communication. MGs also serve as buffers between the
MG-integrated devices and the actual grid. Utilities, instead
of independently communicating and controlling each device
on the distribution level (e.g., distributed generators, inverters,
energy storage, loads, etc.), hand over control to MG manage-
ment systems. Thus, by serving as a nexus between utilities
and devices, MGs help reduce significant communication
delays, costs, and computation resource overuse [28]. We will
leverage a similar approach in our impact analysis; the specific
details of our MG setup are presented in Section V-A.
Different inverters exist in order to accommodate the field
application requirements of grid systems [29], [30]. For in-
stance, depending on the generation source, inverters can
be categorized as solar, battery, thermoelectric, and hybrid
inverters. Solar inverters are electronic devices which enable
the conversion of DC power generated by the PV panels to
AC power which can be fed back to the power grid or can
be supplied to local appliances. Additionally, based on their
output characteristics, inverter technologies can be of square
wave, sine wave, or modified sine wave [31]. Depending on
the connection practice, inverters are also classified as off-grid
or grid-tied. In this work, we focus on solar, pure AC sine, and
grid-tied microinverters which are the most prevalent topology
in MGs [32].
The main difference between standard solar inverters and
microinverters is that for the former, the output of an array of
interconnected solar panels is provided to the centralized solar
inverter, while for the microinverter, every panel is connected
to its own microinverter. The main disadvantage of standard
inverters is that the generated power depends on their least
efficient solar panel. Microinverters are optimally designed to
take full advantage of the connected PV panel reaching power
conversion efficiency of up to 96% [33]. This is achieved using
the maximum power point tracking (MPPT) mechanism em-
bedded in the microinverter, which ensures that the maximum
available power can be extracted from the PV panel under the
varying environmental conditions (e.g., shading, high ambient
temperature, etc.). In the rest of the paper, the terms inverter
and microinverter are used interchangeably, without loss of
generality, since similar principles dictate their operation.
The dependency of microinverters on COTS components
provides the “smart” functionalities of modern embedded de-
vices such as remote OTA updates, communication and control
support functions, and high-speed data sampling and acqui-
sition. However, this also incurs security vulnerabilities [34],
[35]. In addition to being deployed in insecure or unsupervised
environments, these controllers were not initially developed
with security in mind, and their resource-constrained archi-
tectures provide limited options for improvements in this
direction. Multiple attacks targeting controllers in industrial
control systems and critical infrastructure have been reported
in literature highlighting the need for potent attack detection
frameworks [36]–[40].
B. Hardware Performance Counters
In order to detect firmware attacks on MG systems, we uti-
lize HPCs. HPCs are special-purpose registers, found in most
modern processors, that monitor critical low-level microar-
chitectural events like the number of cache-misses, branch-
misses, instructions, etc., and developed to improve system
performance. Typically, HPC collection is attained through
operating system packages such as perf in Linux systems,
or other software binaries like quickhpc utilizing the PAPI
framework. The number of HPCs that are accessible as well
as the number of HPCs that can be monitored simultaneously
differ from processor to processor. Some processors only
support a couple of HPCs while others support tracking of
multiple events. In situations where HPCs are unavailable
or limited, custom HPCs can be designed to keep track of
features that encapsulate a program’s functionality. In recent
past, HPCs have been utilized along with ML classifiers to
detect malicious applications [19], [25].
C. Machine Learning Classifiers
In this part, we furnish a brief explanation for the ML
classifiers utilized in our experiments. We also present a
background on principal component analysis (PCA) used to
reduce the number of features. Finally, we explain the various
metrics used for quantifying the performance of the utilized
ML algorithms.
1) ML Classifiers: A decision tree (DT) is an algorithm
where the classification model that is built is in a top-down
recursive tree like structure, using mutually exclusive if-then
rule set. The rules for the model are sequentially learned one
at a time based on the initial training dataset [41]. A neural
network (NN) is a ML classifier that utilizes a set of neurons
and layers. Neurons are computational units interconnected
between each other, and every connection contains a weight
linked to it [42]. The classifier learns and adjusts weights as the
model is trained to correctly classify the proper label for the
input tuples. A random forest (RF) is a model that operates
as an ensemble incorporating many DTs. For classification
4problems, the model functions by having each DT furnish a
prediction, and the output of the RF classifier is the prediction
that is most selected [43]. This model operates on the concept
that a group of uncorrelated trees will provide better results
as opposed to utilizing a single tree.
2) PCA for Feature Selection: Although a processor can
consist of multiple HPCs, only few of them can be mon-
itored simultaneously. In order to reduce the set of HPCs
to be monitored, we use PCA, a feature selection technique
managing high dimensionality data with multiple variables.
It is a data reduction technique allowing the user to specify
the number of principal components in the transformed data.
PCA first calculates the covariance matrix which is formed
from the initial dataset of features. The covariance matrix
contains all possible combinations of variance between two
variables. Singular value decomposition is used to factorize
the matrix and extract data in the directions with the highest
variances [44]. Based on the specified principal components,
the values in the matrix correspond to the features in the initial
dataset. The best features can be selected based on the largest
values.
3) ML Terminology and Metrics: In this section, we furnish
the definitions for some ML terminology and measurement
metrics utilized in this paper. A true positive (TP) is a
malicious application correctly labeled malicious and a true
negative (TN) is a benign application accurately classified
as benign. A false positive (FP) is a malicious application
incorrectly classified as benign, while a false negative (FN) is
a benign program mistakenly tagged malicious.
Accuracy is the proportion of the number of predictions
correctly classified to the total number of predictions made.
Accuracy =
No. of (TP + TN)
No. of (FP + FN + TP + TN)
(1)
Precision represents the ratio of positive class classifications
that are correct.
Precision =
No. of TP
No. of FP +No. of TP
(2)
Recall is the proportion of correct positive classifications to
the total number of positive classifications.
Recall =
No. of TP
No. of FN +No. of TP
(3)
III. RELATED WORK
The rapid integration of DERs and smart inverters in the
power grid, besides the operational benefits, raises many secu-
rity concerns. Cyberattacks targeting embedded systems and
programmable controllers have been launched with varying
degrees of impact, ranging from economic losses and power
outages to even life-threatening scenarios [37], [39], [45]–
[47]. Research has emphasized the impact that cyberattacks
targeting smart grid assets, e.g., smart inverters, can have on
MGs as well as the power system in general [48]. Despite the
cybersecurity standards and mitigation strategies which have
been proposed to enhance grid stability, implementing such ap-
proaches results in performance overheads and often requires
specialized equipment which cannot be retrofitted to deployed
legacy devices or ported to proprietary architectures [49], [50].
For instance, security solutions leveraging trusted platform
modules (TPMs), secure boot, and cryptographic signatures
used to validate the integrity of firmware updates, could
address some of the aforementioned issues. However, they
incur an additional overhead of extra hardware modules and
extensive redesign of the deployed and resource-constrained
systems. Thus, novel vendor-agnostic methods – utilizing the
inherent embedded system infrastructure – are essential to
provide better situational awareness and aid the early detection
and recovery of abnormal system operation.
Prior works have shown the capabilities of defending against
malicious firmware. The authors in [51] proposed a software-
only attestation method, VIPER, that checks the peripherals’
firmware’s integrity. This defense approach assumes that the
host CPU and operating system have not been compromised.
The work in [52] utilized a signature verification code method
in the bootloader, which is assumed to have sufficient memory
space, to prevent malicious firmware from being installed onto
a mouse. In [53], the authors proposed a cumulative attestation
kernel architecture consisting of flash microcontroller units for
remote attestation assurance that allowed the inspection of the
integrity of an application’s firmware. Other works like [54]
utilized the addition of an on-chip control flow monitoring
module that detects malicious firmware by checking the con-
trol flow integrity in a system. However, this technique incurs
high performance and storage overhead.
In this work, we use HPC-based AVS for detecting mali-
cious firmware modifications of MG inverters. Utilization of
HPCs for detecting malware was initially proposed by [20],
[55], which was improved upon by applying ML models
in conjunction with HPCs for application classification [19].
The work in [56] detected malware in cyberphysical systems
through real-time quantification of HPCs. The study in [24]
proposed 2SMaRT, an approach that selects the best HPCs
through feature selection and applies a two-stage classifier for
malware detection. In addition, the authors in [57] developed
HPCMalHunter which produces behavioral vectors for pro-
grams created from the HPCs for real-time malware detection.
Furthermore, the works in [22], [25] extended utilizing HPCs
in embedded control systems to detect malicious firmware
modifications through a comparison-based approach. Since
some systems lack adequate HPC capabilities, various methods
of custom HPCs have been proposed in prior works for
malware detection. Researchers have defined and explored
detecting malicious applications through ML models trained
on sub-semantic features [21], [58]. On the other hand, custom
HPCs that count the ordering of specific instructions at the
assembly level are used to train ML classifiers capable of
detecting morphing malware [59].
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide an overview of our threat model
as well as the critical components of the MG inverter controller
and the firmware attacks we designed to disrupt MG opera-
tions. Furthermore, this section describes our proposed custom
HPC-based methodology to detect firmware modifications.
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A. Threat Model
Our threat model considers an attacker who intends to
compromise the microinverter controller aiming to impact the
power conversion process. In order to achieve this goal, we
assume that the attacker has compiled a counterfeit firmware
version and attempts to port it to the actual device [60], [61].
Thus, the attack focal point is on the application level and
aspires to trigger abnormal operations via static firmware mod-
ifications [62]. The adversarial access can either be physical,
by intrusively uploading the malicious firmware and affecting
the microinverter operation, or through remote exploits (e.g.,
OTA firmware update functionality). The attacker exploits
the power conversion process, thereby adversely affecting
the MG operation by injecting malicious code which either
manipulates the operation setpoints or alters the sensor mea-
surements received by the controller unit [63]. These stealthy
process-aware attacks [64], targeting embedded devices and
programmable logic controllers, are difficult to detect and can
have various degrees of impact from equipment failures to
catastrophic collapse of the industrial cyberphysical system.
We demonstrate and discuss the impact of the attacks on
the system in Section V. Further, we exclusively investigate
custom-built security primitives which employ the innate func-
tionalities of embedded devices without requiring sophisti-
cated software (e.g., cryptographic signatures), hardware (e.g.,
TPMs), or compound (e.g., secure boot) security extensions.
B. Microinverter Controller
The objective of a grid-tied inverter is to convert DC power,
provided either from PV panels or energy storage systems,
into AC power that can be sourced to the AC grid or MGs.
This process is supported by CMOS devices used as switches
and filters as well as voltage and frequency control modules
(e.g., pulse width modulation – PWM). The architectural
components of a solar inverter are outlined in Fig. 2.
Microinverters are typically preferred over typical inverter
topologies for residential and PV deployments in the distribu-
tion grid level (< 33 kV ) due to their higher efficiency [65].
A critical component that enables microinverters to attain
high power conversion efficiency is their MPPT controller.
MPPT algorithms aim to find the optimal voltage or current
point which will allow for the maximal power generation
under the constantly changing exogenous conditions affecting
the solar PV panels (solar irradiance, shading, temperature,
etc.). A variety of MPPT tracking algorithms have been
proposed by researchers [66]. Two of the most commonly
utilized MPPT methodologies, which rely on a hill-climbing
Algorithm 1: Perturb and observe (PnO) algorithm.
Initialize Pi, Vi, Measure Vrt, Irt
while MPPT.on do
Prt = Power.calculate(Vrt, Irt)
∆P = Prt − Pi
∆V = Vrt − Vi
if ∆P < 0 then
if ∆V > 0 then converter.currentIncrease()
else converter.currentDecrease()
Pi = Prt, Vi = Vrt
end
process to reach the optimal conversion point, are the perturb-
and-observe (PnO) method and the incremental conductance
scheme [67]. Both of the techniques require that the PV
real-time generation attributes, i.e., voltage and current, are
measured periodically. In this paper, we adopt the PnO MPPT
strategy. However, given the similarities between PnO and
incremental conductance our analysis can be generalized for
both methods. The PnO MPPT tracker uses the sensed PV
attributes (voltage Vrt, current Irt) to generate the reference
current which regulates the DC/DC flyback power stage of
the microinverter [68]. An overview of the PnO operation is
presented in Algorithm 1.
During operating conditions, the PV generation varies due to
environmental factors, e.g., solar irradiance and temperature.
The voltage-to-current relationship for each PV module differs
according to its operating point, hence MPPT algorithms ac-
count for these variations. In both the PnO and the incremental
conductance methods, the power gradient is utilized in order
to reach the MPPT (hill-climbing methods). By leveraging
the real-time Vrt and Irt measurements of the PV and the
∂P\∂V gradient, we can determine if the MPPT point is
reached, and if not, which are the necessary steps in order
to approach it. Algorithm 1 provides a discretized version
of the described procedure, similar to the ones prescribed in
commercial solar inverters such as the microinverter module
used in our experiments.
Since the microinverter’s MPPT leverages the real-time
PV measurements in order to extract the maximum available
power from any given PV module, attackers can maliciously
control the microinveter operation by stealthily tampering
the sensed measurements via firmware modification attacks.
Furthermore, attacks on the MPPT module can lead to large-
scale impact as the MPPT function also controls the DC/DC
boost module which is interfaced to the the DC/AC power
conversion block (Fig. 2). As a result, frequency and voltage
fluctuations can be ported to the grid-tied end of the microin-
verter. In Section V, we demonstrate three different attack
scenarios on the MG system operation with varying degrees
of impact.
C. Firmware Attack Designs
Firmware attacks commonly seek to either shutdown the
operation of the firmware-controlled device or cause malicious
6behavior that would result in an erroneous system output [62].
In this section, we discuss the set of developed attacks which
emulate common scenarios that adversaries might exploit in
solar microinverter code.
1) DoS Attacks: DoS attacks cause the system to be un-
available and not function properly. In other words, the system
is temporarily or indefinitely locked such that the typical
services of a system are non-functional. In this paper, we
have designed a DoS attack that switches between locking
and unlocking the inverter every 10 seconds. This attack is
possible through utilizing the system timer and interrupts to
set conditional flags that restrict the availability of circuit
components. In addition, we applied a diminutive version of
the full system DoS attack limited to just the MPPT functional
component. The ensuing ramifications on the system are
shown in Section V-B1 and Section V-B2.
2) MPPT Input Attacks: The MPPT algorithm output in
the solar microinverter code controls the PV panel output
current for maximum power transfer. The manipulation of
the inputs to the MPPT function can cause lack of efficiency
in the grid without allowing the solar PV to operate in its
full capacity. In this scenario, we focus on developing two
variations of this attack. In the first attack case study, we utilize
the system timer and interrupts to constantly switch between
correct MPPT inputs and an array of erroneous values. These
numbers are arbitrary inputs constantly switched every few
interrupts. The second attack redirects MPPT inputs between
correct values and the output values of a continuous sinusoidal
wave every few interrupts. The resulting effects on the system
are demonstrated in Section V-B3.
D. HPC-Aware Firmware Modification Detection
In this part, we describe our DfS technique to propose
custom-built HPCs in order to improve the security of MG
inverters. In this paper, the MG inverter utilized is a solar
microinverter by Texas Instruments (TI). The inverter consists
of a DIMM100 based controlCARD, which is part of TI’s
F2803x series, that controls the inverter development board.
The available profiling capabilities are extremely limited for
F28x architecture. Currently, the only profiling that can be
accomplished is the count of clock cycles. This is insufficient
to detect malicious firmware modifications since it does not
provide any information on the structure of the program
being executed. Two different applications, one benign and
one malicious, being executed for the same number of clock
cycles, will incur no difference in HPC values. This motivates
us to design custom-built HPCs as DfS primitives of the
MG system. The proposed custom-built HPCs, if integrated
to next generation inverter controllers, will aid in improving
the security and resilience of MG against cyberattacks. It has
been seen that HPCs that count instructions such as loads,
stores, arithmetic, and branch values are beneficial in capturing
the dynamics of an application [59]. Furthermore, the order
of these instructions differ depending on the program being
executed. With very minimal resources to operate with, we
have turned to analyze the process and development of custom-
built HPCs for firmware attack detection.
Listing 1: Snippet of firmware assembly code for solar
microinverter.
03f6438 83a1 MOV AL,@VarA ;Load AL with VarA
03f6439 dc18 ADD AL,@VarB ;Add to AL VarB
03f643a da18 ANDB AL,#0xFF ;AND AL with 0xFF
03f643b dd17 SUBB XAR4, #1 ;Subtract 1 from XAR4
03f643c d918 B 404, NEQ ;Branch Not Equal
03f6438 83a1 MOV AL,@VarB ;Load AL with VarB
03f6439 dc18 ADD AL,@VarA ;Add to AL VarA
03f643a da18 ANDB AL,#0xDA ;AND AL with 0xDA
03f643b dd17 SUBB XAR2, #1 ;Subtract 1 from XAR2
03f643c d918 B 253, NEQ ;Branch Not Equal
1) Custom-built HPC Design and Collection: The custom
HPCs we propose keep track of the order of specific assembly
instructions contained inside the binary executable. These
HPCs are designed to include various types of instructions:
arithmetic (a), boolean (n), store (s), load (l), and branch/jump
(b). Our custom-built HPCs not only count the occurrence
of each of these instruction types, but also the number of
sequences of these instruction types.
Our HPC-based feature vector consists of 30 HPCs: a, s,
l, b, n, aa, as, al, ab, an, sa, ss, sl, sb, sn, la, ls, ll,
lb, ln, ba, bs, bl, bb, bn, na, ns, nl, nb, and nn. In this
representation, a, s, l, n, and b indicate arithmetic, store,
load, boolean, and branch instructions, respectively. Therefore,
the first five HPCs count the number of times each of these
instructions are encountered individually. The remaining HPCs
in the feature vector, in the form of XY , count the number
of X instructions that are immediately succeeded by Y in-
structions. As an example, HPC la counts the number of load
instructions that are immediately followed by an arithmetic
instruction. On the other hand, HPC al counts the number of
arithmetic instructions that are immediately followed by a load
instruction. We also propose HPCs like bb, which count the
number of times a branch instruction follows another. As an
example, Listing 1 shows a sample firmware assembly code
for the solar microinverter. In this code segment, HPCs la,
an, na, and ab would all be two, while HPC bl would be one.
Meanwhile, HPCs n, a, b, and l would be two, four, two, and
two, respectively.
The imitation of traditional HPC collection during simu-
lation can be addressed by sampling the designed HPCs in
the disassembled firmware assembly code at specific intervals.
In this paper, we collect HPC counts every 50 assembly
instructions, i.e., our sampling interval is 50. Other collection
intervals can also be employed, albeit, with a different number
of HPC counts. The process flow graph in Fig. 3 outlines
our proposed technique. First, the high-level firmware code is
converted into assembly code through a disassembler. Next,
we sample instructions from the assembly code periodically
until we encounter 50 instructions, i.e., our sampling interval.
The values of the HPCs are recorded and the counters are reset
to zero. This process is repeated until we exhaust all available
assembly instructions. The recorded custom-built HPCs form
a dataset, which can be used to train ML models and detect
malicious firmware modifications, thereby obtaining a DfS
solution against these attacks.
Unlike traditional AVS, our DfS technique is robust against
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Fig. 3: Proposed HPC collection and utilization flow diagram.
attackers that aim to obfuscate a malicious firmware through
the insertion of statements at the code level. Any insertion of
additional statements will engender the disassembled firmware
assembly code to differ. Therefore, in the presence of un-
desired instructions, the sampling of our custom-built HPCs
from this assembly code will result in dissimilar values from
the golden HPC trace. As a result, the ML model will be
able to classify these camouflaged malicious firmware. The
static disassembly code utilized is sufficient for distinguishing
between benign and malicious firmware. Furthermore, TI
currently provides no tools for attaining dynamic traces for
applications on our experimental platform. The proposed DfS
technique is applied on a real-world commercial firmware,
specifically, TI’s solar microinverter that is controlled by
a Piccolo TMS320F28035 Isolated ControlCARD. This DfS
method can be utilized in other embedded systems where
procurement of the assembly code is possible; albeit, with a
difference in custom-built HPCs that can be sampled based
on the available assembly instructions. Furthermore, our DfS
technique is agnostic of the MG model and device. Our method
does not utilize any physical measurements directly from the
grid which might be maliciously falsified [69]. The custom-
built HPCs are sufficient for securing the solar microinverter
because any deviations in performance or operational ranges
would be engendered from malicious firmware that would be
detected by our proposed defense. In addition, compared to
previous work that uses custom-built HPCs [59], our proposed
technique utilizes a wider variety of features, e.g., we incorpo-
rate boolean instructions. Additionally, prior work was focused
on protecting general purpose computers, while our work is
primarily concerned with securing commercial real-time power
grid devices, i.e., solar microinverters.
V. IMPACT ANALYSIS & DETECTION RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the effects of firmware
attacks on a MG system. We further demonstrate the efficiency
of our proposed custom-built HPC-based methodology in
detecting modifications in the microinverter’s firmware code.
A. Microgrid System Model
In order to evaluate the impact of the firmware modification
attacks discussed in Section IV-C, we develop a simulation
Fig. 4: Structure and specifications of the simulated MG
model.
model for the MG system. We utilize Matlab to model the
MG components including loads, generators, energy storage
systems, etc. Furthermore, we use a discrete time model
for the microinverter whose MPPT controller leverages the
aforementioned PnO methodology (Algorithm 1). The grid
architecture used for the MG simulation is depicted in Fig. 4.
The simulation model of the MG includes all the components
found in a realistic MG setup: a solar PV with its solar
microinverter, a lithium-ion battery energy storage system,
a diesel generator, and residential and industrial loads. The
MG components are connected via a distribution substation
transformer with a capacity of 250 MVA to the utility point
of connection operating at 13.8 kV. The distribution voltage
feeder level is set to 5 kV and step-down transformers are used
to interface the generation assets and the loads. The nameplate
generation capacity for the diesel generator is set to 1 MW.
The maximum generation capacity for the microinverter can
reach 250 kW following the PV insolation profile. As for the
energy storage system, it can generate up to 100 kW (capacity
of 100 kWh). The loads of the MG include an aggregated
residential load with a constant power demand of 250 kW
and a variable lumped industrial load whose power demand
ranges between 250-750 kW.
B. Attack Impact Analysis
The base case for our MG system is in islanded mode of
operation. The islanding (or autonomous) feature of MGs is a
fail-safe mechanism employed to protect both the distribution
and transmission electric grid system if either one operates
abnormally. In such scenario, the MG is responsible to meet
the power demand of all the contained loads (e.g., industrial,
residential, etc.). The islanding operation of the MG is pre-
sented in Fig. 5. Specifically, at t = 0 sec, the islanding
command is issued, either by the DSO or MG operator, which
explains the frequency fluctuation. At t = 35 sec, we have
a power demand increase (from 500 kW to 800 kW) in the
MG – also resulting in frequency fluctuation – as can happen
in realistic grid applications. We investigate how the MG
operation is impacted under three different attack scenarios
with regards to the MG operation depicted in Fig. 5. The
three attack scenarios involve: (i) a DoS attack on the MPPT
controller, (ii) a DoS attack on the microinverter, and (iii) an
input-tampering attack of the MPPT controller affecting the
overall power conversion process.
1) DoS Attack on the MPPT Controller: In this type of at-
tack, we modify the microinverter firmware and switch off the
8Fig. 5: Nominal base case of MG behavior.
Fig. 6: MG behavior under MPPT DoS attack.
Fig. 7: MG behavior under microinverter DoS attack.
MPPT functionality. As explained in Section IV, MPPT is a
feature that has been recently included in inverter architectures
as it can boost their power conversion efficiency. By disabling
this feature via a DoS-type of attack, malicious adversaries can
expect that the generated power enabled by the microinverter
will be lower. This is validated by simulation results presented
in Fig. 6. If the MPPT functionality of multiple inverters is
disabled, thus leading to severely curtailed solar generation,
it can result in brownout or load shedding events since the
power reserves (e.g., alternative generation sources) might not
be able to cover the power deficit. Although this type of attack
might not have catastrophic impacts on the MG operation, it
can elicit uneconomical power grid operation [70].
2) DoS Attack on the Microinverter: In this case study, we
demonstrate a DoS attack in which we disable the output
(grid-tied) stage of the microinverter. The outcome of the
attack is presented in Fig. 7. As a result of the DoS on the
solar microinverter and the unavailability of the solar PV to
produce power, the ancillary generation sources are required
to meet power demands. In our experiment, a DoS attack
disables the microinverter at t = 15 sec. The inverter gets
Fig. 8: MG behavior under MPPT reference input perturba-
tions.
Fig. 9: MG behavior under high frequency MPPT reference
input perturbations.
back online to operate at t = 30 sec immediately before the
load increases (at t = 35 sec), as per the base case scenario
(Fig. 5). Then, the microinverter gets connected to the MG
until t = 45 sec when a DoS attack switches it off again. In
this case study, the MG operation is severely impacted due to
the frequency fluctuation. Specifically, the malicious control of
the inverter in conjunction with the generator switching, which
is operated complementarily to meet the MG’s power demand,
cause frequency instabilities and adversely effect the grid’s
power quality [71]. The impact could vary from damaged
equipment, load shedding, brownouts, and even total loss of
power (blackout) in case this attack occurs during a peak-load
period when the alternative generation sources cannot balance
the power demand. This is evident by the widespread power
outage across the U.K. in 2019 [72].
3) Input Tampering Attack on the MPPT Controller: As
discussed in Section IV-B, the real-time voltage and current
measurements of the solar PV module are critical for the
efficient operation of the microinverter. The measurements are
used by the MPPT in an effort to reach the optimal condition
and extract as much power as possible from the PVs under the
varying environmental conditions. Thus, by strategically and
stealthily tampering the Vrt and Irt sensed values, attackers
can destabilize the MPPT controller and consequently the
microinverter power generation [71]. The severity of this attack
scenario is illustrated in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, where two error
signals with different frequencies are superimposed over the
sensor measurements. In both cases, the applied signal per-
turbations are constantly moving the operation point (around
9the optimal one) without allowing the MPPT algorithm to
converge and hence, creating an unregulated output behavior.
By compromising the sensed measurements, the effect on
the MG power generation is twofold: first, the microinverter’s
output becomes unstable, and second, the power deficit needs
to be met by alternative power generation units regulating the
unstable inverter output. The latter can either be economically
impractical or infeasible since the inertia of rotating generators
cannot meet this abnormal pattern [73]. As a result, frequency
fluctuations and power outages might occur. If the maliciously
compromised microinverter is not promptly isolated from
the MG (defensive islanding), the introduced power quality
degradation can jeopardize sensitive grid connected devices
(e.g., sensing and data acquisition meters) and loads (e.g.,
industrial and commercial).
C. Attacks Detection Capability
The prompt detection of malware in grid assets’ firmware
code is of paramount importance in preventing any of the
previously discussed adverse scenarios. In this section, we
present the efficacy of our hardware-assisted methodology
utilizing HPCs in detecting malicious firmware modifications.
The detection accuracy of the proposed approach renders it a
viable proposition for real-world power grid applications.
1) Implementation Setup: To demonstrate the effective-
ness of our approach, we test our technique with a real-
world commercial firmware of an embedded microinverter
system [74]. Specifically, the TI solar microinverter supports a
F2803x microcontroller, which we utilized for our testing and
evaluation phase. We employ our custom-built HPCs in order
to detect the firmware modifications within the microinverter’s
code. Four firmware modifications are realized into the solar
microinverter code according to the attack scenarios simulated
in Section V-B, i.e., a DoS targeted attack on the MPPT func-
tionality, a DoS attack on the whole microinverter system, and
two MPPT input manipulation attacks. The attacks are flashed
into the Piccolo TMS320F28035 Isolated ControlCARD using
a DIMM100 Docking Station Baseboard supporting power
and JTAG capabilities. To generate the HPC-based signatures,
a Python script is utilized to count the number of custom
HPCs in the dissembled firmware executable. The TI dis2000
dissembler is used to get the assembly code from the binary
executable. Since HPCs are counted in intervals, our script
collects the total value for each proposed HPC every 50
assembly instructions. We utilized this sampling rate as it is
large enough to capture information about the structure of the
program but small enough to furnish an adequate amount of
samples. We utilized a 70:30 spilt where we trained on 70%
of the dataset with the remaining 30% used for testing. We
aggregate samples from all the attacks and the base code.
With the attained simulated custom HPCs, we build three ML
classifiers generated using the scikit learn library [75], a DT,
a NN and a RF, as mentioned in Section II-C1.
2) Detecting Firmware Modifications with ML Models:
In order to detect the simulated attacks on the MG model,
we use all the 30 custom-built HPCs to construct the ML
classifiers as shown in Fig. 10. It is observed that each model
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Fig. 10: Malicious firmware detection analysis using all 30
HPCs.
Fig. 11: Malicious firmware detection analysis using only three
HPCs.
is capable of identifying the firmware modifications with high
precision. The best measurement metrics are attained with the
RF classifier, which provides an accuracy of 76.4%, precision
of 95.1%, and recall of 79.53%. The accuracy and recall for
all models is partially diminished because the training dataset
has only one benign base version of the solar microinverter
code and four malicious firmware variations.
3) PCA Feature Selection in ML Models: Since most
modern processors are only capable of tracking a couple of
HPCs at a time, we used PCA, as described in Section II-C2,
to determine the top best features: boolean, arithmetic and
branch instructions (n, a, and b). These features are robust
for malicious firmware detection as they can adequately cap-
ture many of the malignant tendencies found in pernicious
firmware. Compromised firmware will attempt to deviate from
the normal control flow of the system which increments
branch instructions and engenders malicious activity such
as manipulating outputs or internal system functions which
increments boolean and arithmetic instructions. Moreover,
reducing the number of custom-built HPCs aid in decreasing
the hardware overhead of the DfS architecture. These three
dominant features are used to train a new set of models as
shown in Fig. 11. Experiments show that the performance
metrics for each classifier are bolstered on application of
PCA. The DT and RF classifiers have peak accuracy of
75.84% and 79.21%, respectively, and peak precision of
89.51% and 95.8%, respectively. The NN classifier furnishes
the best results since the accuracy improves from 75.28% to
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TABLE I: Overhead of individual classifiers.
Design lsi 10k Library saed 90nm Library
Decision Tree Area Overhead 2108 sq. units 8930.814878 sq. unitsPower Overhead 44.8547 µW 478.9462 µW
Neural Network Area Overhead 37062 sq. units 153799.401513 sq. unitsPower Overhead 343.7231 µW 5429.1 µW
Random Forest Area Overhead 2618 sq. units 11004.428258 sq. unitsPower Overhead 47.7563 µW 529.3894 µW
80.33% and the precision improves from 93.7% to 100%.
While all models could detect the firmware attacks, the NN
is able to detect, with high accuracy and precision, all the
malicious firmware samples. This demonstrates the benefit of
PCA feature selection utilized in our models. When utilizing
30 HPCs, the model becomes overfitted, but applying PCA
engendered us to attain the optimal set of HPCs required
to construct an effective model. Only three custom HPCs
are sufficient to provide a robust defense against malicious
firmware modifications, thus significantly reducing the DfS
hardware overhead. We realized the ML classifiers in Fig. 11
in hardware to establish their area and power overhead. We
designed the RTL for the DT, NN, and RF and synthesized
them through the Synopsys Design Compiler logic synthesis
tool. We have employed two digital standard cell libraries,
saed 90nm and lsi 10k. Our results related to the power and
area overhead acquired from our synthesis of the RTL are
presented in Table I.
4) Instruction Elimination Analysis: In this experiment, we
train ML models on datasets in which any one of the five
instructions, i.e., a, s, l, n, and b, are excluded at a time.
As an example, BLAN represents the scenario in which only
branch, load, arithmetic and boolean instructions are included.
As a result, HPCs like sa and sb are not considered in
BLAN . Fig. 12 shows the performance comparison for the
ML classifiers on all possible omission combinations. The
best results are furnished by the NN classifier trained on the
BLAN dataset. The performance metrics of 79.2% accuracy
and 98.6% precision are the highest throughout all the models
trained. This is significant because the experiments presented
in Section V-C3 have shown that boolean, arithmetic and
branch instructions are by far the most dominant.
In order to further prove the strength of n, a, and b instruc-
tions, we trained a final set of models on datasets in which two
of the five instructions are excluded. That is, BAN indicates a
dataset in which store and load instructions are omitted. Fig. 13
shows the classification performance attained from all possible
instruction datasets. The NN trained on the BAN dataset has
the highest precision of 99.3%, which further supports our
previous results. Therefore, HPC support for only boolean,
arithmetic, and branch instructions can assist in providing
better DfS for embedded microinverter controllers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate the impact of firmware
modification attacks on a solar microinverter operating in a
MG setup. We propose the detection of such stealthy attacks
by leveraging custom-built HPCs as DfS and periodically
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Fig. 13: Performance with two excluded instructions.
sampling the instructions within the inverter’s firmware. Our
proof-of-concept work validates that devices without native
HPC support can be hardened against adversaries leveraging
DfS primitives. Specifically, we improve the security of TI’s
F2803x microcontroller leveraging custom-built HPCs. Our
experiments demonstrate that ML models trained on our HPCs
identify firmware attacks with high accuracy and precision.
Apart from providing an approach to secure solar microin-
verters without HPC support, we demonstrate the potential
impact of compromised devices in MG deployments operating
autonomously.
In the future, we will include custom-built HPC extensions
for other firmware-controlled grid assets and formalize our
detection methodology for additional firmware attacks (e.g.,
rootkits, command injection, etc.). We plan to evaluate our
framework utilizing hardware-in-the-loop experiments includ-
ing grid-tied inverters and MG components, refine and improve
educational and laboratory tutorials [76], and demonstrate the
impact of these attacks in real-time operation.
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